In the first of two articles
on the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, the author discusses
role in planning and executing the program successfully.
During my deployment to Iraq to provide support to Operation
Iraqi Freedom, commanders sometimes expressed frustration that
the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) did not meet
their expectations. I believe the commanders’ perceptions
stemmed, in part, from the fact that they did not fully understand
their roles and responsibilities in planning and executing
the program and did not always have realistic expectations
of the program’s capabilities. LOGCAP’s strengths
lie in preplanned support and economies of scale and effort.
These strengths have not been exploited fully because of incremental,
bottom-up planning rather than top-down, integrated staff planning;
underdeveloped theater contracting management processes; and
a lack of knowledge at all levels of what the program can do
and how to access it.
Two major findings of a 2004 Government Accountability Office audit of LOGCAP
operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were that the Department
of Defense did not comply fully with guidance on identification of contracting
requirements early in the planning process and that the LOGCAP contractor was
not adequately involved in the planning process. I believe that Army Materiel
Command (AMC) Pamphlet 700–30, LOGCAP, does not detail the tactical- and
operational-level mechanics of LOGCAP or provide “how to” information
the combatant commanders (COCOMs) and Army service component commanders (ASCCs)
need to properly implement the contract during contingency operations. In this
article, the first of two on proper planning and employment of LOGCAP, I will
attempt to help fill some of the voids in that doctrine.
Army Regulation (AR) 700–137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP),
establishes Department of the Army (DA) policies, responsibilities, and procedures
for implementing LOGCAP to augment Army forces during wartime. AMC Pamphlet 700–30
outlines procedures for commanders at both the DA and regional COCOM levels to
follow when requesting and implementing LOGCAP services.
However, the pamphlet does not discuss operational and tactical execution or
program mechanics. Nor does it explain fully how to maximize the program’s
capabilities or establish who is responsible for identifying or validating LOGCAP
requirements, writing statements of work (SOWs), preparing independent cost estimates,
tracking funds obligated against the SOWs, or reviewing the technical execution
program at the operational and tactical levels. Likewise, the responsibilities
of the requiring and using activities are not addressed in the pamphlet.
. . it is imperative that logisticians fully integrate,
in logistics plans and orders, the functions performed
by contractors together with those performed by military
personnel and government civilians.
Joint Publication 4–0,
Doctrine for Logistics Support
of Joint Operations
According to AR 700–137, the four main objectives
of LOGCAP are to—
• Resolve the combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) unit
shortfalls represented in operation plans (OPLANs) and in the Army program.
conversion of existing support units based on availability of contract support
• Provide rapid contracting capability for contingencies not covered by
• Provide for contract augmentation in the continental United States during
LOGCAP provides for preplanned use of global corporate resources to support worldwide
contingency operations. The program is designed to provide support primarily
in areas of operations where no bilateral or multilateral agreements or treaties
exist, but it may be used to provide additional support in areas where formal
host nation support agreements are in place. This support is provided by augmenting
CS and CSS forces with contractors. Civilian contractors provide the Army with
additional means to support current and programmed military forces by performing
services such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peace enforcement,
Civilian contractor support in a theater of operations frees soldiers and other
military personnel to perform combat arms and CS missions. During the military
drawdown of the 1990s, some Army CS and CSS functions were reduced and personnel
transferred from Components (Compos) 1, 2, and 3 (Active Army, Army National
Guard, and Army Reserve, respectively) to Compo 9 (LOGCAP).
Although LOGCAP is an Army program, it can, with proper preplanning, coordination,
and training, support other services in joint operations, Federal agencies through
memorandums of agreement, and coalition partners through acquisition and cross-servicing
The need for LOGCAP has increased as a result of reductions in the military force
structure and reallocation of CS and CSS manpower to sustain the Army’s
combat arms capabilities. Mandated force structure caps also have increased the
need for contractors. The escalated U.S. involvement in military operations other
than war, such as those in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and East Timor, have
strained the military operating tempo (OPTEMPO). LOGCAP provided support in those
operations to reduce the “green-suit footprint,” decrease individual
soldier OPTEMPO, and improve the deployed soldiers’ quality of life.
|A KBR employee
demonstrates proper sawing techniques to two Iraqi
laborers as they construct a new military camp near
The LOGCAP base contract operates under an indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity
umbrella contract (one that covers many functional areas in one or more locations).
The base contract provides for the
winning contractor to develop a worldwide management plan; participate in exercises
as directed; when requested by DA or funded by a COCOM, prepare LOGCAP annexes
to joint OPLANs; and execute plans or provide logistics support to operations
when directed by the contracting officer.
The LOGCAP contract was awarded competitively; it has a 1-year base period and
nine 1-year renewal options. The current contract was awarded to Kellogg Brown & Root
(KBR) in December 2001. The contract does not stipulate a monetary ceiling; however,
the number of events or contingencies KBR can support is limited.
The chart above shows some of the services LOGCAP can provide. This is not a
complete list; in fact, there are few restrictions on the services that can be
provided as part of the LOGCAP contract.
One of the most frequent misperceptions about LOGCAP is the fact that it is a
service contract, not a supply contract. Therefore, it cannot be used to buy
items or products. For example, the LOGCAP contractor can operate a motor pool
and provide maintenance services for nontactical vehicles, but the Government
cannot use the LOGCAP contract as a means to purchase the vehicles. The LOGCAP
contractor can provide billeting services with environmentally controlled housing,
but the contractor should not be used simply to purchase the housing. However,
the contractor may purchase the items necessary to perform the services required
under the contract.
All LOGCAP SOWs must be legally reviewed by the requesting command and the Army
Field Support Command (AFSC) to determine if the requested work is permissible
under current U.S. law, if the work is within the scope of the underlying LOGCAP
contract, and if the requirements are properly funded.
LOGCAP is not a personal services contract. Therefore, it cannot be used to hire
personnel who take day-to-day direction from military personnel or DOD civilians.
Planners must factor legal reviews into their planning timelines and work with
their Judge Advocates General and LOGCAP advisors to ensure compliance with Department
of Defense and Army Federal Acquisition Regulations.
The Department of the Army (DA) Deputy Chief of Staff, G–4, is the Army’s
proponent for the LOGCAP program, and he approves its use in all operations.
AMC is the Army’s executive agent for LOGCAP and has task-organized
LOGCAP operations under AFSC. AFSC has three organic elements dedicated to
• The Directorate of LOGCAP Operations (DLO) (formerly PM LOGCAP) manages
LOGCAP. The DLO prioritizes planning requirements based on funding, workload,
and DA guidance and advises the COCOMs on LOGCAP capabilities. DLO operations
personnel are stationed forward with AMC logistics support elements (LSEs) in
Southwest Asia, Europe, and the Far East.
• The LOGCAP Support Unit (LSU) provides the soldier, or “green-suit,” interface
between the COCOM or ASCC and the contractor; it deploys worldwide in support
of LOGCAP operations. The LSU is responsible for advising the COCOM, ASCC, or
joint task force commander on how to access, use, and integrate LOGCAP properly
in contingency operations. In small, single-site operations, such as the 1999
humanitarian mission in East Timor, an LSU soldier also may serve as the contracting
officer’s representative. The LSU has three detachments of logistics and
engineer officers with teams aligned to support each of the COCOMs. Four Active
Guard/Reserve officers are included in the structure.
• The Procurement Contracting Officer (PCO) manages the LOGCAP contract
and subordinate task orders and statements of work during peacetime and contingency
During contingency operations, these three elements deploy into the theater of
operations and serve under the operational control of the theater AMC LSE Forward.
Additional Department of Defense and DA assets from the Defense Contracting Management
Agency (DCMA) and the Army Corps of Engineers may be task-organized with the
LSU, DLO, and PCO to form “Team LOGCAP.”
Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom
In November 2002, KBR deployed to Kuwait to prepare
Camp Arifjan in Kuwait for the anticipated influx
of U.S. troops. Since that time, KBR has—
•Prepared more than 160 million meals.
•Washed more than 6.2 million bundles of laundry.
•Produced more than 1 billion gallons of potable water.
•Transported more than 300 million gallons of fuel.
•Hosted more than 18 million patrons at morale, welfare, and recreation
•Delivered more than 560,000 bags of mail.
•Logged more than 50 million miles transporting supplies and equipment
for the military (with more than 900 trucks on the road each day).
KBR now has 48,000 employees and subcontractors deployed to Kuwait and Iraq to
support the U.S. military. Although KBR and its subcontractors have lost a number
of their personnel to hostile actions, they continue to honor their commitment
to ensure that the troops serving in Iraq have the best food, shelter, and quality
of life possible.
DCMA administers the contract in theater as delegated by
the PCO and provides quality oversight through its quality
assurance representatives. The agency develops,
trains, and manages the contracting officer’s technical representatives
in the supported units. DCMA also evaluates contractor performance and issues
letters of technical direction when needed. When required, the Army Corps of
Engineers provides engineering and construction contracting officer’s technical
representatives to evaluate LOGCAP operations.
Although Team LOGCAP facilitates implementation of the LOGCAP contract, the supported
unit is the most critical “member” of the team when executing the
contract. Supported units include the COCOM, the ASCC, the joint force land component
command, joint task force, and their subordinate units. LOGCAP is not a “fire-and-forget
contract” (a reference to a type of missile that does not require further
guidance after launch). To maximize LOGCAP capabilities, the contractor must
be fully integrated into staff planning and execution processes, then monitored
closely by DCMA and the supported unit. Without the full engagement of the supported
unit, contractor capabilities and performance will be reduced.
The keys to maximizing LOGCAP’s capabilities are integrated military and
contractor preoperation planning and standard support criteria for using the
program in a theater. An LSU support officer must be included in the staff planning
process before and throughout the operation to advise the commander on LOGCAP’s
DLO and LSU personnel are trained to advise commanders on the entire menu of
LOGCAP services, inform them of program capabilities and limitations, and advise
them on how to establish processes that will ensure effective operation of the
program. These LOGCAP liaisons are not trained strategic planners; they are logistics
and engineer officers or DA civilians. In past operations, DLO and LSU personnel
have often been called “planners,” which misled the supported units
to assume they were qualified planners (perhaps with functional area 59, Strategic
Plans and Policy, or skill identifier 6Z, Strategist, designations) and expect
them to conduct LOGCAP planning for their units. On the contrary, the supported
command is responsible for planning and integrating LOGCAP into its OPLAN.
LOGCAP personnel can be accessed through the DA G–4 or through AMC LSE
elements in Southwest Asia, Europe, the Far East, and the Army Forces Command
in the United States. These elements have organic DA civilian LOGCAP operations
personnel. The AFSC’s DLO also has DA civilian and contracted operations
The LSU has the most experience in executing LOGCAP operations on the ground
in combat operations. During peacetime, ASCCs and personnel in theater support
and corps support commands can learn much by tapping into the LSU’s collective
experience, knowledge, and capabilities during theater and joint exercises. Participation
in an exercise requires coordination through overseas coordination conferences
and the ASCC G–3 in order to document future overseas deployment training
KBR produces 74 million gallons of water per month
Because LOGCAP is not automatically approved for use in COCOM
OPLANs or contingency plans (CONPLANs) and must be approved
by the DA G–4, the LSU is not included
in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) on any existing OPLANs.
In Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, this disconnect resulted in
an “ad hoc” mobilization and deployment process, which impeded LOGCAP
capabilities. To prevent a recurrence in future operations, the DA G–3
should be notified in a general-officer-level requirement letter from either
the DA G–4 or AMC to mobilize LSU personnel as soon as theater planning
begins and a requirement for LOGCAP has been identified, validated, and approved.
LSU personnel then can be called forward into theater by the AMC LSE Forward
commander as needed.
It is absolutely critical that the LOGCAP contractor be involved in the planning
process as soon as possible to ensure that he has enough time to formulate the
plan, hire and train the required personnel, and procure the proper type and
quantity of equipment and move it into the theater to support the mission. Without
a comprehensive, upfront SOW, additional costs are sure to result from unknown
requirements. A good initial SOW that is designed to augment organic military
capabilities will help ensure proactive planning and performance.
To enhance the integrated planning process, COCOMs and ASCCs must ask that
a LOGCAP contractor planning cell be incorporated into their theater planning
Since the LOGCAP contract is preawarded, contractor input during the planning
process does not present a conflict of interest. An underused provision of
the LOGCAP base contract calls for the contractor to provide a planning cell
existing theater OPLANs and CONPLANs and write the LOGCAP annexes during periodic
reviews of those plans. It is critical that the COCOM specify that personnel
in the LOGCAP contractor planning cell must have CS or CSS theater-level planners’ backgrounds
and top-secret security clearances. Quality, upfront integrated planning, sufficient
time, and adequate funding of the SOW will help ensure success in providing
support during the operation. The northern theater-opening option through Turkey
was developed by U.S. European Command and U.S. Army Europe at the beginning
of Operation Iraqi Freedom is a good model for a theater-funded contractor
planning cell. It is unfortunate that diplomatic barriers forced the 4th Infantry
to deploy through Kuwait and those plans were not carried out.
In the July–August issue of Army Logistician, I will discuss planning considerations
and identify critical tasks and management processes that will assist the U.S.
military in maximizing LOGCAP’s capabilities in future operations. ALOG
Colonel Karen E. LeDoux is a student at the Army War College. She was the
Commander of the LOGCAP Support Unit Forward in the Army Materiel Command Logistics
Element (AMC LSE) Forward-Southwest Asia with the Coalition Forces Land Component
Command and the AMC LSE Iraq supporting Combined Joint Task Force 7. She is a
graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army Logistics
Management College’s Associate Logistics executive Development Course,
Joint Course on Logistics, and Multinational Logistics Course.
The author would like to thank Major Jeanine Cunliffe, S–2/3 of the LOGCAP
Support Unit and LOGCAP Support Officer in the Multinational Division-Central
South, and Major Karl “Rudy” Schelly, LOGCAP Operations Officer in
Combined Joint Task Force 7, for their advice and assistance in the preparation
of this article.